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One obvious use for the econometric models of  charitable giving dis- 
cussed in chapter 2 is to predict the effects of changes in tax rules, income, 
and effective tax rates on the level of  contributions. By  replacing actual 
values of  price and tax liability by values implied by a given tax rule it is 
possible to use estimated equations to give “predicted values” of giving. 
Not only are such simulations useful in assessing the impact of projected 
changes on the nonprofit sector, they may also be used to estimate the rev- 
enue effects of tax proposals affecting the treatment of charitable giving. 
This chapter discusses simulation methods and results as applied to con- 
tributions by individuals.  In its assessment of various tax policies, the 
chapter is positive rather than normative. Issues such as the comparative 
social worth of expenditures by charities and government are deferred to 
chapter 8. Section 3.1 describes various tax rules that have been proposed 
or discussed in recent years. Section 3.2 summarizes previous simulations 
showing likely effects of some of these rules on contributions. The next 
section discusses the major methodological issues confronted in perform- 
ing simulations of charitable giving. Section 3.4 presents new simulations 
of individual giving in 1983 under a variety of possible tax regimes. The 
results are compared to previous simulations. The final section of  this 
chapter presents two sets of simulations for contributions over time. The 
first of  these is historical and focuses specifically on the effect of the ex- 
pansion of the standard deduction on giving. The second is prospective, 
focusing primarily on the effect of inflationary bracket creep on real giv- 
ing over time. 
3.1  Policy Alternatives 
Two kinds of tax policies can have a significant influence on individual 
giving. Most obvious are policies dealing directly with the charitable de- 
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duction or charitable giving. Also of potential importance, however, are 
general tax changes that affect incomes and tax rates. 
3.1.1 
Before dealing with specific proposals to modify the itemized deduction 
for contributions, it is useful to note two principal pillars of support for 
this deduction. The first is the argument that since income contributed by 
a family cannot be consumed, contributions are a proper deduction in cal- 
culating taxable income. As put forth by Andrews (1972), this view sup- 
ports the existence of a deduction but not a tax credit for contributions. A 
second argument takes the view that, while contributions are a discretion- 
ary use of income, they merit public support through some kind of tax in- 
centive. By this view,  deductions or credits may be desirable, depending 
on the incentive effects involved. According to Break (1977, p. 1523), the 
political support that the deduction has enjoyed over the years is due in 
large part to the combined appeal of these quite different justifications. 
The variety of proposals that have been made to change the charitable 
deduction can be understood as efforts either to rectify perceived inequi- 
ties or to increase incentives to give. Because the deduction tends to dimin- 
ish the  effective progressivity of  the income tax as a whole (Pechman 
1977, p. 72), those who view contributions as a consumption item often 
object to the deduction’s distributional consequences. Those who favor 
incentives for giving, on the other hand, may favor increasing those incen- 
tives beyond what is created by the deduction. Not surprisingly, such ex- 
tensions would imply revenue losses. Other proposals accept the role of 
incentives in the income tax but seek to restructure them by replacing the 
deduction with a tax credit. 
Provisions Explicitly Related to Contributions 
Expansion of the Charitable Deduction 
One of the most important alternatives for encouraging contributions is 
to expand the present deduction. For example, the Commission on Pri- 
vate Philanthropy and Public Needs (1977) proposed that itemizers at cer- 
tain income levels be permitted to deduct a multiple of their actual contri- 
butions  to  provide  an added  incentive to give.  Such  a  multiple  or 
“amplified” deduction would have a significant impact on the price of 
giving and some income effect as well. The commission’s proposal limited 
the coverage of this multiple deduction, allowing a double deduction for 
taxpayers with incomes less than $15,000 and a 150 percent deduction for 
taxpayers with $15,000 to $30,00Oin income.’ There is no limit, of course, 
to the variety of rate schedules that could be used for a multiple-deduction 
1. An alternative sliding scale was also suggested. See Commission on Private Philanth- 
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plan. All such multiple deductions would tend to reduce tax revenue un- 
less tax rates were increased, however. 
Another possibility for expanding the charitable deduction is to extend 
the deduction to nonitemizers. Often referred to as the “above-the-line” 
deduction because it would take the form of an adjustment to gross in- 
come rather than a deduction in calculating taxable income, this plan was 
proposed and actively discussed beginning in the late 1970s.* Then, as a 
part of the 1981 tax act, a schedule for phasing in an above-the-line chari- 
table deduction was adopted.  Beginning with a deduction limited to 25 
percent of the first $100 in 1982 and 1983, the provision is scheduled to 
take full effect in 1986.3  This long phase-in period seemed designed to put 
off  the inevitable revenue losses as far as possible into the future. By al- 
lowing all taxpayers to deduct charitable gifts, an above-the-line charita- 
ble deduction would nullify the effect of changes in the standard deduc- 
tion on contributions. To the extent that the expansion of  the standard 
deduction since 1941 has reduced contributions, such a plan thus would 
have the effect over time of returning contributions to the level they would 
have been if the standard deduction had not been introduced. 
Limitation of the Charitable Deduction 
Concern for equity in taxation has inspired the call for limiting, rather 
than expanding, the deduction. In the extreme, this view implies eliminat- 
ing the deduction altogether. For example, the Treasury’s model compre- 
hensive income tax released in 1977 argued that contributions constitute a 
discretionary form of consumption and that no deduction should be al- 
lowed in an ideal income tax (U.S. Treasury Department  1977, p. 95). 
This view  is  also implicit in recent broad-based  flat-tax proposals that 
would allow few if any deductions from gross income. Even groups inter- 
ested in support for nonprofit organizations have raised questions about 
the charitable deduction’s detrimental impact on overall tax progressivity. 
The Donee Group, a group opposed to many of the recommendations of 
the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, implied that 
the charitable deduction should be eliminated or significantly altered as a 
part of “basic tax reform.”4 It is fair to add, however, that support for the 
2. Bills sponsored by Representatives Fisher and Conable and by Senators Moynihan and 
Packwood were the subject of  hearings and debate in 1979 and 1980. See U.S.  Congress, 
Senate 1980. 
3. The deduction was to increase to  25 percent of the first $400 in 1984 and 50 percent with- 
out limit in 1985. 
4. In its report, the Donee Group (1977, pp. 71-72)  stated: 
In discussing changes in the tax laws affecting charity, we must first state that the Donee 
Group favors basic tax reform to restore the progressivity of the income tax and to elimi- 
nate those preferences and other devices which allow great disparities  to continue. We do not, 
however, believe that if tax reform is gradual and piecemeal, as it is first to  go. We believe 
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abolition of the charitable deduction is still quite limited. For the most 
part, the deduction is justified on the basis of its presumed incentive effect.s 
While the deduction itself appears to retain strong support, incremental 
limitations  on it have periodically been proposed  and enacted. As de- 
scribed in chapter 2, percentage-income limitations have been adjusted 
from time to time, as has the deductibility of gifts of appreciated assets. 
One limitation that is currently applied to gifts to private foundations, 
and one that could conceivably be applied in the future to other contribu- 
tions, is the constructive realization of capital gains in gifts of appreciated 
property. Such a provision would make it necessary for donors to include 
as income the capital gains associated with donated property. If 40 percent 
of long-term gains are included as taxable income, a taxpayer donating 
property worth $1000 of which $500 is capital gains would have to pay tax 
on $200. Since this treatment is equivalent to realization and contribution 
of proceeds, the effect would be to raise the price of contributions to that 
applying to gifts of cash. 
Another method of limiting the deductibility of gifts of appreciated as- 
sets is to allow only the cost basis of  such gifts to be deducted. As Break 
(1977, pp.  1525-7) shows, however, this would cause some taxpayers to 
prefer  to  make  cash  contributions,  whereas  constructive  realization 
would leave donors indifferent between giving assets and giving the cash 
proceeds. 
Finally, any charitable deduction may be limited by allowing only those 
contributions that exceed some floor to count in reducing taxable income. 
Floors may be stated as a percentage of income, as in the case of the medi- 
cal deduction, or as an absolute amount. The primary reason for impos- 
ing a floor is to limit the revenue loss associated with a given provision, al- 
though floors may also offset adverse distributional effects of a deduction. 
Tau Credit for Contributions 
One widely proposed alternative to the charitable deduction is a chari- 
table tax credit. Instead of subsidizing contributions at a rate that varies 
with a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, as under the deduction, a tax credit 
would subsidize all taxpayers at the same rate. In this connection Mus- 
grave and Musgrave (1980, p. 362) comment on the current deduction, “A 
philosopher-economist might observe that the opportunity cost of virtue 
falls as one moves up the income scale.” Citing the “great inequity” inher- 
ent in differing rates of subsidy, the Donee Group objected to the propos- 
als of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs calling 
for the preservation and augmentation of the charitable deduction. As an 
5. The Treasury report noted this justification in listing a charitable deduction as one “op- 
tional method” of treating contributions (U.S. Treasury Department  1977, p. 95). Another 
justification, supported by Andrews (1972), is the argument that contributions are not prop- 
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alternative to the deduction, this group proposed a 30 percent tax credit 
(Donee Group 1977, pp. 72-73). Whether it is justified on the basis of eq- 
uity in treatment of taxpayers at different income levels or on the basis of 
efficiency in the subsidization of all gifts, the idea of a tax credit appears 
to have sustained support as an alternative to the deduction as a means of 
encouraging charitable giving. 
3.1.2  Proposals Not Directly Related to Contributions 
Tax changes not  directly targeted at contributions may nevertheless 
have a sizable impact on giving. Any proposals  that cause significant 
shifts in after-tax income, restructuring of  marginal tax rates, or changes 
in the proportion of  taxpayers who itemize deductions can influence the 
incomes and prices affecting donor contributions. Moreover, tax sched- 
ules that are not indexed to the rate of inflation generally will change over 
time  in  real  terms,  with  much  the  same effect  as  legislated  schedule 
changes. For example, an unindexed progressive tax schedule will yield in- 
creasingly progressive effective rate schedules in the presence of  infla- 
tion.’  Whether  they  are  intentional  or  not,  therefore,  quite  general 
changes in effective tax schedules can have important effects on charitable 
contributions. 
Significant effects are most likely from two kinds of tax changes. First, 
movements in the real level of the standard deduction-due  to legislation 
or inflation-will  influence the number of itemizers and, accordingly, the 
number of taxpayers facing prices of giving less than one. As shown above 
in table 2.7, the proportion of  taxpayers who itemize has tended to vary 
inversely ,with the constant dollar value of  the maximum-allowed stan- 
dard deduction. Second, any restructuring of the tax rate schedule itself 
will  also affect prices and net incomes. Thus, the choice between a tax 
schedule that is  indexed for inflation and one that is  fixed in nominal 
terms is  relevant to the prices and net incomes affecting giving. Other 
things equal, inflation will push taxpayers into higher tax brackets as well 
as increase the number of itemizers, thus lowering the price of giving for 
many taxpayers. The effects on giving of changes over time in tax rates, 
the standard deduction, and the price level are analyzed below in section 
3.5. 
3.2  Previous Simulations 
Before discussing in detail some of the methodological issues confronted 
in simulating the effects of tax changes, it is useful to review some of the 
results of previous simulation exercises. The first full simulation based on 
6. See chapter 8 for an analysis of the efficiency aspects of subsidy rates under a deduction 
7. See, for example, Clotfelter 1984. 
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an econometric model of  charitable giving was presented by  Feldstein 
(1975a). In it he estimated that the elimination of the deduction in 1968 
would have caused giving to fall by 34 percent (p. 96). More elaborate sim- 
ulations appear in Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) and Feldstein and Tay- 
lor (1 976). 
Table 3.1 presents simulated changes in contributions and tax revenues 
for a wide variety of tax provisions, based on the Feldstein-Taylor model 
and the 1970 file of individual tax returns. In these simulations a price 
elasticity of -1.285 and an income elasticity of +  0.702 were employed. As 
indicated by  the simulated changes in tax revenues, no adjustment was 
made in tax rates to keep revenues constant. Tax credits of 25, 30, and 50 
percent show increasingly large gains in giving compared to actual 1970 
levels. According to these simulations, the 25  percent tax credit would 
yield contributions closest to the actual level, just 4  percent above actual 
contributions. Allowing taxpayers to choose between a tax credit or a de- 
duction would retain the high rates of subsidies for upper-income taxpay- 
Table 3.1  Simulated Effects on Contributions of Alternative Tax 
Provisions, 1970 
Tax Provision 
Change in  Change in 
Contributions  Revenues 





Optional tax credit 
25 percenta 
30 percentb 
30 percent (itemizers only)b 
Extend deduction to noniternizersb 
Constructive realization of gifts 
of appreciated assetsb 
Floor on deduction 
$looa 
$500a 
2 percent of AGIa 
3 percent of AGI~ 
Eliminate deductionb 
+  0.7 
+  2.3 
+ 12.8 
+  2.1 
+  3.4 
+  1.5 









+  74 
+ 12 





-  18 
-  17 
-  20 
-  26 
- 0.7 
- 2.1 





+  0.3 
+  0.9 
+  2.4 
+  2.3 
+  2.7 
+  3.5 
aSimulations provided by Martin Feldstein using the 1970 tax file Break.  1977, pp.  1532, 
1535,and 1537. 
bFeldsteinand Taylor 1976, p. 1218, table 6. 106  Contributions by Individuals 
ers while providing the tax credit for nonitemizers and those with low 
marginal rates. 'At the 25 percent rate, making the credit optional would 
raise the predicted increase in contributions from 4 to 12 percent; at the 30 
percent rate the increase in giving would rise from 13 to 20 percent. Of the 
20 percent gain under the 30 percent optional credit, about half (9 percent) 
of the increase is attributable to increased giving by itemizers whose mar- 
ginal tax rates are lower than the tax credit rate. Extending the charitable 
deduction to nonitemizers is predicted to increase total gifts by 7 percent, 
an amount that is less than the optional 25 percent credit because of the 
low marginal tax rates of most itemizers. In general, the simulations sug- 
gest larger changes in contributions than in revenues, as would be expect- 
ed with an elasticity value greater than one in absolute value. 
Among the simulations of proposals that would restrict the deductibil- 
ity of  contributions, the constructive realization of capital gains on asset 
gifts is predicted to reduce total gifts by 3 percent. Larger declines in giv- 
ing would result from the imposition of floors of $100 or more in the de- 
duction. The predicted reduction is 7 percent for a $100 floor and 18 per- 
cent for a $500 floor. There is little difference in effect between floors of 2 
and 3 percent of gross income, for which contributions are predicted to 
fall 17 and 20 percent, respectively. 
The least favorable simulation is the complete elimination of the deduc- 
tion. The Feldstein-Taylor simulations for 1970 using micro data imply a 
reduction of 26 percent in contributions. This result compares to a pre- 
dicted  34  percent  reduction  for 1968 based  on pooled  aggregate data 
(Feldstein 1975a, p. 96) and a 26 percent reduction for a sample of house- 
holds in I963 (Feldstein and Clotfelter 1976, p. 22) using similar models. 
While the first two simulations are for itemizers only, the last is based on a 
sample of  all taxpayers. Not surprisingly, the biggest impact of eliminat- 
ing the deduction is felt at upper income levels, where the increase in the 
price of giving is greatest. To indicate what this distributional effect im- 
plies for gifts to various donee groups, Feldstein and Taylor used the 1962 
distribution of  gifts to predict  giving by  organization type.  Table 3.2 
shows the simulation results for the elimination of the deduction. Giving 
to educational institutions and hospitals was predicted to fall the most, 
owing to the dependence of those organizations on gifts from upper in- 
come taxpayers. 
3.3  Methodological Issues in Simulation 
The starting point in simulation models of charitable giving is the basic 
single-equation model discussed at length in chapter 2. Using the log-lin- 
ear form, this model can be written: 
(1)  InG = a + blInP  + bzln Y + cX+  u, 107  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
Table 3.2  Simulated  Effects of Eliminating the Charitable Deduction by 










-  22 
-  27 
-  48 
-  46 
-  33 
-  26 
Source: Feldstein and Taylor 1976, p. 1218 table 4. Note that the “health and welfare organi- 
zations” category used by the authors is renamed in accordance with the data source-U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of  Income-1962,  Individual Income Tax Returns 1964, 
p. 6,  table E-“Other  charitable organizations.” 
where G is contributions, Pis  price, Yis after-tax income, Xis  a vector of 
other variables included in the equation, u is an error term representing 
the effect of unmeasured characteristics and errors in model specification, 
and a, bl,  b2,  and the vector c are true parameters. For any given values of 
the independent variables (say Po,  YO,  and XO),  the predicted value of  the 
logarithm of giving is given by 
(2)  In Go  = 6 + 6,  In p0 + 6,  In yo + cx0, 
where 6, &, 62, and 2 are estimated coefficients. Adding the error repre- 
senting the deviation of the actual from the predicted value, denoted  ti, 
yields 
(3)  In GO  = B + 61  In PO  + 62  In  YO + 2x0  + ti. 
The basic relationship used in simulation models is obtained by com- 
bining an equation such as (3) with the corresponding equation using the 
price and net income variables that would be observed under an alterna- 
tive tax regime. For example, suppose a given tax regime would yield first- 
dollar price and income values of PI  and YI. Assuming there is no change 
in&,  that equation is: 
(3’)  InGI  = d + 611nPI  + h21n y1 + tx0  + ti, 
where In GI  is the predicted value for the logarithm of giving. Subtracting 
(3) from (3 ’) and rearranging yields: 
(4)  In GI  = In Go + 6, (1nPI  .-  In PO)  + 62  (In YI -  In YO), 
or 
(5)  PI 61  YI 62. 
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Only those variables whose simulation values differ from their base val- 
ues-typically  only those affected by  tax rules-appear  in this expres- 
sion.* If  only one tax-defined variable is  affected by  a tax change, the 
other term drops out. If a tax change affects neither the price of giving or 
net income, the simulated value ff would be equal to the base value Go.  It 
is useful to  emphasize in this context that tax variables are the only ones to 
appear in the simulation equation only because they are the only variables 
assumed to change. It is unlikely that there are more than a few individ- 
uals,  if  any, for whom taxes constitute the most important reason for 
making  charitable gifts.  By  focusing on changes in tax variables, the 
model seeks to predict the effects of a change in tax policy. Models such as 
this do not, as has been suggested, “ ‘  [presume] that philanthropy is gov- 
erned primarily or principally by tax considerations’ ” (Ketchum 1982, 
P. 2). 
It is important to note that the estimated-error term ii drops out of the 
expression for the simulated value of  giving. Whatever omitted factors 
that cause an individual’s contributions to diverge from the predicted value 
in the base period are assumed to operate in the same way if the alternative 
tax regime were adopted. The resulting simulated value thus differs from 
the actual value only in the combined predicted effects of  independent 
variables that change as a result of  a change in tax rules. The error with 
which any estimated equation predicts a given individual’s contributions 
arising simply from the error term ti is thus typically ignored for the pur- 
pose of sim~lation.~ 
As  an application of  prediction  within the context  of  an estimated 
econometrjc model, this simple framework for simulating the effects of 
tax changes on charitable giving is relatively straightforward. It is impor- 
tant, however,  to give attention  to several methodological issues that 
arise. The first of these relates to the statistical error associated with all 
predictions.  The other methodological issues relate more specifically to 
the case of charitable contributions. 
3.3.1  Statistical Errors in Prediction 
Two kinds of statistical errors are relevant to the prediction of charita- 
ble giving using an estimated econometric model. First, there is an error 
associated with each individual observation. As denoted by ti in equation 
(3), this error measures the deviation of  the actual observed value from 
the value that is predicted by the regression equation. It may reflect un- 
measured individual characteristics or specification errors. As discussed 
above, this error is not considered in simulating the effect of tax changes; 
such individual error terms are assumed to operate the same under any tax 
regime. The second kind of  error is the statistical sampling error associ- 
8. See, for example, Feldstein and Clotfelter 1976, p. 2011. 
9. See, for example, Feldstein and Taylor 1976, p. 1216. 109  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
ated with the parameter estimates. The coefficients 6,  and h2 in equation 
(5) will inevitably be estimated with less than perfect precision. The stan- 
dard errors of these estimates may be used to  indicate the statistical preci- 
sion of  the predicted value. If coefficients are estimated with large errors, 
the predicted value correspondingly is imprecise; if coefficients are esti- 
mated with little error, predicted values are relatively precise. In his review 
of  econometric studies  of  charitable contributions,  Zellner  (1977, pp. 
15  15-6)  emphasizes the importance of providing measures of precision 
with  predictions.  Previously  published  simulations  have  not  included 
such measures, however. 
For the general linear regression of  the form Y = a + Cb,X, + u, the 
prediction error is given by:  lo 
(6)  kzP = SZ/N  + c (x:  -  XO,)~  Var (6,) 
+ 2 ,$,  (X; -  XO,)  (X’,  -  PI)  cov  (6,  6,>, 
where s2 is the estimated variance of the estimate, N is the sample size, X’  , 
is the value of X,  used for simulation, and XO, is the actual or base value of 
XI.  In general, the size of  the error will vary with two factors. The larger 
the standard errors of the relevant coefficients (as indicated by Var (6,)), 
the less precise will be the resulting predictions. This fact is of course a 
major reason for the interest shown both in the academic literature and 
public debate regarding the reliability of the estimated price elasticities in 
econometric models of  giving.  The second important element determin- 
ing the prediction error is the degree to which the values posited for simu- 
lation (X’  ‘) differ from the observations that serve as the basis for the esti- 
mates. The more the hypothetical values used in simulation differ from 
observed values, the less reliable the prediction will be. For example, there 
would tend to be more error associated with a prediction regarding a ma- 
jor change such as the elimination of the charitable deduction than a mi- 
nor change in the tax law. Variables for which no change is contemplated 
affect neither the prediction nor the prediction error. 
3.3.2  Revenue Effects of Tax Changes 
Virtually any change in tax law, including changes in the treatment of 
charitable contributions, will have some impact on revenues and thus net 
income. In order to  eliminate any aggregate income effect, as well as to  re- 
flect the kind of changes that might conceivably be enacted, it is desirable 
to perform simulations under the assumption of constant tax revenues. 
Feldstein (1975a) and Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) used a proportional 
10. See, for example, Kmenta 1971, p. 375. The prediction error differs from the forecast 
error in that the latter also includes the variance of the individual error terms. The latter er- 
ror terms drop out for the purpose of prediction (see (5)). 
11. See, for example, Zellner 1977, p. 1517 or U.S. Congress, Senate, 1980, p. 227. 110  Contributions by Individuals 
adjustment of tax rates to equalize revenues under various tax rules, a 
procedure followed in the present chapter.l2 Two other effects need to be 
accounted for in making revenue adjustments. First, proportional adjust- 
ment in tax rates will affect the price of giving if there is a deduction for 
contributions.  If revenues are adjusted through a 2 percent increase in 
rates, for example, the price of donating under a deduction rule will fall, 
thus affecting donations. Second, the level of contributions will itself in- 
fluence revenues under various tax rules. This interaction calls for an iter- 
ative procedure in which estimated contributions are used to recalculate 
tax variables, which in turn can be used to estimate contributions again. 
In the model presented in the next section, the effect of changed tax 
rules, contributions behavior, and revenue adjustment are reflected in the 
recursive procedure summarized in expressions (7)-( 15) where TAX is tax 
liability, as defined for any simulated tax regime, G is giving, Pis  the price 
of giving, Ro  is tax revenue under the actual or baseline tax regime, (Y is a 
proportional revenue adjustment parameter, and f,  h,  j  are functions in 
the revenue adjustment process. 
(7)  TAXI = TAX(G  I G=O), 
(13)  TAX2* = h(TAX2, a), 
(14)  P2* = m,  a), 
(15)  G2  = G(TAx~*,  P2*). 
Initial values for tax liability and  price in  (7) and.@)  are first-dollar 
amounts, calculated using actual values of all tax parameters except con- 
tributions. An intermediate value of contributions is calculated in (9) us- 
ing TAXl to determine net income. This equation corresponds to the basic 
prediction equation given in (5). Equations (10) and (11) repeat the first 
two steps with this new value of contributions. In (12) an adjustment fac- 
12. By contrast, Feldstein and Taylor (1976, p. 121511) made no revenue adjustment, noting 
the relatively small percentage change in net income. 111  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
tor is calculated based on the total revenue generated under the simulated 
tax regime as compared to the original tax regime. In the simple case in 
which the simulated tax regime has no effect on tax credits, this adjust- 
ment function is simply 
(12’)  (Y  = Ro/TAX2, 
and tax liabilities in (13) are adjusted proportionally. In this case, (14) be- 
comes 
(14’)  P2*  = 1 -  cY(1 -  P2). 
This adjustment process must be modified when tax credits are affected 
by any proposed tax change.I3  Finally, the adjusted values obtained in (13) 
and (14) are used in (15) to obtain a final estimate of giving. 
3.3.3  Itemization Status 
Needless to say, a taxpayer’s itemization status is one of the most im- 
portant pieces of information available in predicting the effect of a change 
in tax treatment. Before 1981 only itemizers were allowed to deduct gifts. 
General tax rate changes affected the price faced by  itemizers, while a 
charitable tax credit or a deduction extended to nonitemizers might cause 
a significant decrease in the price faced by  nonitemizers. In simulating 
contributions for some hypothetical tax regimes, therefore, it is necessary 
to determine whether a given taxpayer will be an itemizer or not. It is use- 
ful to distinguish between changes in itemization status that are largely in- 
dependent of the tax treatment of contributions from those that occur be- 
cause of changes in that tax treatment. 
Exogenous Changes in Itemization 
The more important reason  for changes in itemization status is  the 
change  from year to year in the  standard  deduction  (now the  “zero- 
bracket amount”) relative to the increase in the nominal value of house- 
holds’ deductible expenditures.  When expenditures rise faster than the 
standard deduction-as,  for example, when the standard deduction does 
not change during an inflationary period-more  taxpayers find that their 
deductible expenditures exceed the maximum allowable standard deduc- 
tion. Accordingly, the number of itemizers rises. Although contributions 
are one part of these deductible expenditures, taxes and interest represent 
the bulk of such items for most taxpayers. In simulating the tax changes 
over time or tax changes involving an adjustment of the standard deduc- 
tion, it is necessary to provide for a change in itemization status for some 
taxpayers. 
13. Where tax credits are affected, for example, the proportional adjustment is applied 
only to tax liability before credits so that credit rates and price are unchanged. 112  Contributions by Individuals 
Modeling the itemization  decision of  a rational taxpayer involves a 
straightforward comparison between the allowable itemized deductions 
that he could report (ZDi) and the applicable standard deduction (SD;). If 
IDi > SDi,  the taxpayer has a smaller tax liability by itemizing deductions, 
and the simple model predicts that he would be an itemizer. If ID; < SDi, 
the taxpayer would not itemize. In a micro data set with information on 
all potential  itemized deductions  for all taxpayers,  this  simple model 
would be quite appropriate for use in simulations involving changes in 
itemization. Where deduction data are available only for itemizers, how- 
ever, it is not possible to utilize this approach without first generating hy- 
pothetical deductions data for nonitemizers, a method necessarily depen- 
dent on arbitrary allocations.14 
A model of itemization using aggregate data relates the ratio of gross 
income and the standard deduction to the probability of itemizing, using a 
logistic function. Where Z is the probability of  itemization, AGZ is  ad- 
justed gross income, and SD is  the maximum standard deduction, the 
function is 
Z  AGZ  Y 
1-z 
The constant  is the elasticity of the odds in favor of itemizing with re- 
spect to the income-standard  deduction ratio. An equation of this form 
was estimated for a pooled time-series/cross-section  sample of aggregate 
tax return data covering 1973 to 1980 and even years from 1948 to 1972.15 
Taking logarithms and adding a time trend yields the following equation, 
estimated,by ordinary least squares: 
(17)  In -  =  1.24  In -  AGZ  +  0.020  (Year-1947), 
1-z  (0.02)  SD  (0.004) 
R2 = 0.90, N = 483, 
where AGZis mean income and Zis the proportion of taxpayers who item- 
ize by income class. As illustrated in table 3.3 for 1980, the regression’s 
predicted values closely track the actual proportion of itemizers. For the 
purpose of predicting changes in the proportion of itemizers, it is useful to 
use equations (16) and (17) to write an expression relating new values of 
income, the standard deduction, and the itemization proportion (denoted 
by primes) to the observed values: 
z’  =  z  (AGZVSD’)  1.24 
1-I’  1-Z  AGZ/SD  . 
14. See Feldstein and Lindsey 1981 for simulations using data of this type. 
15. See Appendix B for a description of this data set. 113  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
Table 3.3  Actual and Predicted Percentage of Taxpayers Who Itemized in 1980, 
by Income Class 
Percentage with Itemized Deductions 
Income  Actual  Predicted 
$0 under 5,000 
$5,00Ounder 10,000 
$10,00Ounder 15,000 
$15,000 under 20,000 
$20,000 under 25,000 
$25,000 under 30,000 
$30,000 under 50,000 
$50,000 under 100,000 
$100,000 under 200,000 
$200,000  under 500,000 
$500,000 under 1,000,000 

























Source: Actual percentage: US.  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1980,  Indi- 
vidual Income TaxReturns 1982, p. 41, table 1.3; p. 57, table 2.1. Predicted percentage: see 
text. 
To illustrate the magnitude of the estimated itemization elasticity of 1.24, 
consider a 10 percent increase in the ratio of income to the maximum stan- 
dard deduction, caused, for example, by a 10 percent increase in income 
with no change in the standard deduction. For a class with 40 percent of 
taxpayers itemizing, this change would imply an increase in the percentage 
itemizing to 45.5. For a class with 95 percent itemizing already, however, 
the percentage’would increase only to 96.0. In summary, although the lo- 
gistic relationship between the probability of itemization and the income- 
standard deduction ratio does not directly model a taxpayer’s choice be- 
tween allowable itemized and standard deductions, by accounting for the 
relationship between nominal income and the maximum standard deduc- 
tion it does provide predictions regarding changes in itemization. 
Endogenous Changes in  Itemization and Deduction Floors 
For the purpose of simulating the effects of most tax changes, a less im- 
portant cause of changes in taxpayers’ itemization status is the treatment 
of contributions itself. As outlined in chapter 2, the itemization decision is 
a function of contributions behavior for a relatively small group of tax- 
payers. For these taxpayers the standard deduction acts as a floor for the 
deductibility of contributions, and the taxpayer faces a nonconvex budget 
set. The choice of contribution level, and thus itemization status, depends 
on the shape of  the individual’s indifference curves. Similarly, an explicit 
floor for the deductibility of contributions (e.g., as a percentage of in- 114  Contributions by Individuals 
come or an absolute amount) also creates a nonconvex budget set with 
similar behavioral implications. 
In order to simulate giving in the presence of nonconvex budget sets, 
Feldstein and Lindsey (1981,  p.  14) employed an explicit direct utility 
function in the manner of  Hausman  (1981)  and Reece and Zieschang 
(1982) to make comparisons among points on the budget line for individ- 
uals who might be either above or below the deduction floor. The func- 
tional form they chose implies constant price and income elasticities of p 
and p, respectively: 
Substituting previously estimated price and income elasticities, they ob- 
tained a value of  k;  for each individual as the value that made observed 
giving equal the utility-maximizing amount. From this they were able to 
allow for taxpayers switching itemization status. Their calculations imply 
that about 6 percent of itemizers would stop itemizing if charitable deduc- 
tions were eligible for a separate deduction.16  In the simulations presented 
in the section 3.4, such endogenous shifts in itemization are not consid- 
ered. Only shifts due to changes in the income-standard  deduction ratio 
are allowed for. 
3.3.4  Dynamic Considerations 
The effects of tax changes on charitable giving may vary over time. One 
possible dynamic pattern would result from the existence of lags in peo- 
ple’s  adjustment to tax changes. If such lags are at work, tax changes 
would tend to have less immediate impact than after the passage of time. 
Another possibility is that taxpayers may attempt to time their contribu- 
tions so  that their tax liabilities are minimized. It is well known that esti- 
mates obtained in regressions using cross-section data may not be appro- 
priate for simulating changes through time.17  As applied to the simulation 
of tax effects on contributions, it is useful to consider simulation models 
that deal specifically with dynamic effects of tax policy. The first model 
deals with lags in adjustment, and the second takes into account the possi- 
bility of timing gifts. 
Lags in Adjustment 
The incomplete-adjustment  model discussed in chapter 2 provides an 
explicit  form  for distinguishing short-run  and  long-run  effects of  tax 
changes on giving. This model may be written: 
(20)  Gr = G*+  G::$, 
16. See Feldsteinand Lindsey 1981, pp.  14-16. 
17. See, for example, Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977, p. 174; Nelson 1977a, p.  1505; or 
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(22)  GI  + k  = G*@  Giy@k  -1, 
where 6  is a constant coefficient of adjustment and G*  is the simulated, or 
long-run, value of contributions resulting from a given tax regime.'* If the 
long-run level of giving G* differs from the initial level GI,  and G* does 
not change, actual giving will tend to approach but not reach long-run giv- 
ing. The time path for giving in response to a hypothetical tax change is il- 
lustrated in table 3.4. The time path of  charitable contributions by non- 
itemizers is simulated for the institution of a full charitable deduction in 
year 1, assuming initial contributions of $12.1 billion, an average margin- 
al tax rate of 0.2  for nonitemizers, and a price elasticity of -1.2. The long- 
run level of contributions implied by the constant-elasticity model is $15.8 
bi1li0n.l~  Based on the adjustment coefficient of  0.37 estimated in Clot- 
felter (1980b, p. 333), contributions by nonitemizers after one period are 
calculated to be $13.4 billion (15.8°.37  12.11-0.37),  anincreaseof $1.3 billion. 
The revenue loss from the deduction, approximated as the marginal tax 
rate (0.2) multiplied by actual giving of $13.4  billion, is $2.7 billion. Given 
these parameters, the increase in giving due to the deduction would not ex- 
ceed 90 percent of the long-run increase before the sixth year. In addition, 
the increase in giving would not exceed the revenue loss before the fifth 
year, even though the (long-run) price elasticity is greater than one in ab- 
solute value. If the parameter estimates are assumed to be valid, this sug- 
gests that the full effects of tax policy are unlikely to be felt immediately. 
This simulatioq casts little light, however, on the effect of tax rules that 
are phased in slowly or whose effective date is delayed after passage of leg- 
islation. For example, the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act, which was 
signed in August  1981, provided for a deduction for nonitemizers that 
would become fully available only in 1986. 
Timing Eflects 
An itemizing taxpayer who expects to face different marginal tax rates 
in successive years can reduce his total tax liability by increasing the pro- 
portion of gifts he makes in the high-tax year. More generally, there is an 
incentive for making deductible expenditures in tax years in which the net- 
of-tax price is least. The potential for timing charitable contributions is 
especially great because giving tends to be more discretionary than most 
deductible expenditures. One obvious manifestation of timing behavior in 
charitable giving is the tendency for a major change in tax rates to be ac- 
companied by an acceleration of giving to take advantage of low prices in 
the old law or a deceleration if the new law offers lower prices. 
18. See equation (19) in chapter 2. 
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Note: Assumptions: (1) Long-run price elasticity is -  I .2. (2) Where Gt and C*  are actual and long-run giving levels in year I,  9  is a coefficient of adjustment 
equal to .37, G* = (0.8)-'.2(12.1),  G, = (G*)@  (Gt- 117  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
Timing behavior might also be important if  a floor were placed under 
deductible contributions, giving taxpayers the incentive to "bunch" their 
gifts over time. For example, consider a $200 deduction floor. A taxpayer 
who faces a 25 percent marginal tax rate and who plans to give $1000 over 
two years would reduce his taxes by $200 if  he made all his gifts in one 
year, compared to a saving of only $150 if  he gave equal amounts each 
year. Feldstein and Lindsey (1981) analyze bunching behavior in a simula- 
tion of  various deduction floors. Their basic model assumes that bunch- 
ing occurs only within a two-year time horizon and that bunching is an all- 
or-nothing decision. The probability of bunching (PROB)  is taken to be a 
function of the after-tax cost of giving if there is no bunching (CG)  and 
the cost if there is bunching (BCG): 
(23)  PROB = 1 -  (BCG/CG)O, 
where p  is a positive constant. Using the example given above, in which 
CG = $850 and BCG = $800, a value of 0.5 for p would imply a bunching 
probability of  0.03 while p  = 10 implies a probability of 0.45. Because 
there exist no empirical studies of bunching for the case of contributions, 
Feldstein and Lindsey present results based on a range of values for p. Ta- 
ble 3.5 presents their simulations of extending deductibility for contribu- 
tions to nonitemizers in 1977. Whereas they project an increase in giving 
of $4.5 billion and a revenue loss of $4.1 billion with no floor, the addition 
of floors reduces both changes.  'O  The effect of  bunching is to lessen the 
changes, but, as Feldstein and Lindsey note, wide variation in the bunch- 
ing assumption makes little difference.'' 
3.3.5  Contrilkions by Nonitemizers 
Because  of  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  data  on  contributions  by 
nonitemizers, some researchers have employed a modification of the basic 
simulation model of giving. Feldstein and Lindsey (1981, p. 27) estimated 
the contributions made by a nonitemizing taxpayer by selecting an itemiz- 
ing taxpayer with similar demographic characteristics and calculating the 
predicted quantity, taking into account only the difference in price and in- 
come bet ween the taxpayers : 
(24)  G, = Gi  (PJPi)" (  Y,/ X)b 
= c;  Pi  -  "( Y"/  Yi)b, 
where n refers to the nonitemizer and i to the itemizer. This approach is 
based  on the assumption that the difference in contributions between 
20. The principal reason why Feldstein and Lindsey's estimated $4.5 billion increase ex- 
ceeds the $3.7 billion increase calculated for table 3.2 is their use of a price elasticity of -1.3. 
21. A variant of  the complete bunching model considered by Feldstein and Lindsey as- 
sumed that only a portion of gifts would be subject to bunching. The model and results are 
similar to those of the complete  bunching model. Table 3.5  Feldstein-Lindsey Simulations of Changes in Contributions by Current Nonitemizers, 1977 (amounts in billions of  dollars) 
Full Deductibility  $300 Floor  3 Percent of 
AGI Floor 
Changes in  Changes in  Changes in 
Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes 
No bunching  +  4.506  -4.101  + 3.608  -  2.430  + 3.039  -  1.944 
Bunc hinga 
p = 0.5 
p  = 2.0 





-  +3.617  -  2.442  +3.051  -  1.955 
-  + 3.645  -  2.447  + 3.089  -  1.988 







-  b  -  +  4.079  -2.818  + 3.686  -2.347  ** 
Source: Feldstein and Lindsey 1981, p. 36, table 4. 
aSee  text for explanation of bunching model. 
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itemizers and nonitemizers can  be  attributed  entirely to differences in 
price and income.  Because of  the strength of this assumption  and the 
availability of survey data on contributions by nonitemizers, estimates of 
contributions by nonitemizers in the present study are based directly on 
such survey information. 
3.3.6  Gifts by Donee Type 
Because of  its great practical significance, it is quite useful to reflect in 
simulations the distribution of giving by  type of  organization.  As dis- 
cussed in chapter 2, however, there is considerably less information re- 
garding the distribution of  gifts than in giving in general. The studies at- 
tempting to measure separate price and income effects by type of donee 
typically have been subject to a large degree of uncertainty. An alternative 
approach taken by Feldstein and Taylor (1976, p.  1217n) and Clotfelter 
and Salomon (1982), is to simulate tax effects on total giving and then to 
allocate this total giving to various donee groups using proportions that 
vary by income level. This approach carries the implicit assumption that 
the price elasticity does not vary at any income level for gifts to different 
donee classes. In addition, the use of  old distributions, such as those 
based on 1962 tax returns, is obviously flawed to the extent that the real 
distribution has changed over time. Despite these drawbacks, the simula- 
tions  presented  in the next  section use past  distributions  modified for 
changes in the price level in order to suggest how tax policy may affect 
gifts to different types of nonprofit organizations. 
3.3.7  Simulation and the Validity of Econometric Models of  Giving 
Finally, it is dseful to note a more general methodological issue that re- 
lates to simulation using any estimated  econometric model,  including 
those estimated for charitable giving. The econometric model underlying 
a simulation exercise inevitably contains implicit maintained hypotheses 
that may limit the validity of the simulation results. The choices of which 
variables to include and how to define them affect the validity of the simu- 
lations in the same way they affect the validity of the estimates. For exam- 
ple, the incorporation of the effects of  itemization and the marginal tax 
rate into a single price variable embodies the hypothesis that there is no 
itemization effect apart from the price effect, an issue discussed in chapter 
2. Similarly, the inclusion of net income as a variable supposes that an in- 
crease of $100 in gross income will have the same effect as a $100 decrease 
in taxes. In much the same way, it is typically assumed that labor supply 
and thus earnings are independent of the tax provisions being examined. 
To the extent that such assumptions are incorrect, simulations based on 
them will also be flawed. 
Some possible influences on giving are excluded from estimating mod- 
els because little or no information or variation has been observed. For ex- 120  Contributions by Individuals 
ample, the basic model of  charitable giving allows no role for charitable 
organizations’  financial condition or solicitation activity. Charities are 
implicitly assumed to be passive recipients of contributions. As implied by 
Zellner (1977, p. 1518), as well as some of the discussion of charitable giv- 
ing following the Reagan cuts in federal aid, individuals may respond to 
the financial plight of  charities by  increasing their contributions  com- 
pared  to what  they  would  have given otherwise. According to Butler 
(1981, p. 9), “If the flexible patterns of the past are any guide, the struc- 
ture of giving will shift in favor of these organizations hurt by the cuts and 
seen by the public as socially valuable. ”  Charities themselves may respond 
to hard times by stepping up solicitation efforts. 
It is therefore necessary to understand simulation results as being a ce- 
teris paribus exercise in predicting outcomes in response to a hypothetical 
policy. They can reflect the effects of changes only in variables included in 
the model; other influences have to be assumed to be constant. Because 
estimated models have been unable to reflect some possible “systems re- 
sponses,” the resulting simulations  obviously cannot take such effects 
into account. The simulations are thus predictions about the outcomes of 
certain policy changes, other things equal. 
3.4  Simulations of Individual Giving for 1983 
In order to provide current projections of charitable contributions un- 
der different tax regimes, a simulation model using aggregate data is pre- 
sented. This section describes the data and special features of  the simula- 
tion progx‘am  and then presents a variety of simulations for 1983. 
3.4.1  Basic Data 
The primary source of data for this simulation exercise is the 1980 Stat- 
istics of Income, which gives aggregate tax return information by income 
class. While disaggregated data have a number of important advantages 
over aggregate data in estimation of charitable giving models, there are 
advantages to aggregate data in simulation. The identification of separate 
price and income effects is a central concern in estimation, and disaggre- 
gated data are usually better able to distinguish these effects by producing 
more precise parameter estimates. For most simulations of charitable giv- 
ing, however, the effects of tax changes are proportional in nature. The 
result is that simulations of major policy changes using both kinds of data 
sets produce quite similar results. Only for behavior involving discontin- 
uities such as “bunching” is disaggregated behavior clearly superior. As 
noted above, changes in itemization status could be simulated easily using 
an appropriate disaggregated data set, but existing data sets do not pro- 
vide adequate information on potential itemized deductions by  nonite- 
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provided the most recent available data on income, taxes, and contribu- 
tions as well as comparable data that could be analyzed over time. 
In order to reflect important differences among taxpayers, four types 
of taxpaying units are defined for each income class given in the Statistics 
of Income: single itemizers, single nonitemizers, joint itemizers, and joint 
nonitemizers. The comparatively few returns that were not single or joint 
were allocated between one of these two tax-status groups.22  Exemptions 
other than for dependents were allocated to single and joint returns in 
each class according to the distribution of adult  taxpayer^.^^ Dependent 
exemptions were allocated so that the number of dependents per return in 
joint households would be a constant multiple of  that in single house- 
hold~.~~ 
In order to obtain appropriate 1983 levels of variables, income, deduc- 
tion, and tax-credit data were assumed to grow at the predicted rate of per 
capita national income. The number of taxpayers was assumed to grow at 
the average rate of population growth between 1980 and 1983.2s  In order 
to estimate the number of taxpayers at each income level who itemized 
their deductions, the 1980 proportions for each income class were adjusted 
to take into account the growth in nominal income in relation to the (sta- 
tionary) zero-bracket  amount. For this purpose,  equation (8) was used 
with an itemization elasticity of 1.24. 
The basic Statistics of Income data for 1980 provides information on 
charitable contributions by itemizers and income for all taxpayers as well 
as all information needed to calculate taxes and tax rates. Data on contri- 
butions by nonitemizers were based on modified tabulations from the Na- 
tional Study of Philanthropy, adjusted so as to correspond to the 1980 in- 
come brackets used for all other data.z6  The percentage distribution of 
22. In 1980 42 percent of taxpayers filed single returns and 48 percent filed jointly, leaving 
only 10 percent who fell into other tax-status groups. 
23. This includes the blind, over-65, and taxpayer exemptions. Where J and NJ are joint 
and nonjoint returns in an  income class, the proportion of adult exemptions assigned to  joint 
returns in that class was (2J/(2J + NJ)). 
24. Joint returns in 1980 had an average of I .34 dependent exemptions while single returns 
had 0.33, for a ratio of 4.1 (U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statisticsof Income--1980, Indi- 
vidual Returns 1982, p. 70 table 2.4). Where DJ and DNJ are dependents in joint and non- 
joint returns, the assumption that the ratio of dependents per return in joint households is 
4.1 that in single households can be written: (DJ/J)/(DNJ/NJ)  = 4.1. This implies DJ = 
D/((NJ/4.1J)  + l),  where D is the total number of dependents in the class. 
25. Nominal GNP was $2633 billion in 1980 and $3262 billion in 1983 (U.S.  Council of 
Economic Advisers 1983, p. 163; U.S. Office of Management and Budget 1983, pp. 2-9). for 
a ratio of 1.293. Population grew at an expontential rate of 1.064 percent annually between 
1978  and  1981; P(t) =  P(0) exp  (gt), where g  =  0.01064. For  1980-83,  this  implies 
P(1983)/P(1980) = 1.032. Thus, per capitaGNP growth was 1.239/1.032 = 1.201. 
26. See Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977, p. 193. Because of the small number of nonitem- 
izers in higher income classes, averages in the top four income classes were smoothed. Aver- 
age giving for nonitemizers by income class in 1973 dollars was assumed to be: under $4000: 
$69; $4000under 8000: $89; $8000under 10,000: $117;  $10,000under 15,000:  $201; $15,000 
under 20,000:  $329; $20,000 under 50,000: $354; $50,000 under $200,000:  $2003; $200,000 
and over $6946. These figures were then inflated and prorated to correspond to 1980 income 
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gifts to various kinds of donee organizations by income class is based on 
the 1962 Statistics of Income data used in previous studies. Again, the 
data were interpolated so as to yield the appropriate 1980 income classes. 
3.4.2  Calculation of Taxes and Contributions 
With four taxpayer types in each of twelve income classes, each simula- 
tion consists of separate calculations for forty-eight representative house- 
holds, each representing a different number of actual taxpayers. In order 
to calculate taxes and tax rates, the actual or hypothetical tax law was ap- 
plied to data on average income, exemptions, and deductions for each re- 
presentative household.  Tax liability calculated in this manner for 1980 
using actual values of contributions yielded an estimate of total revenue 
of $250.2 billion, compared to actual revenues of  $249.1 billion. For the 
purpose of simulating taxes or standard price and income effects on chari- 
table giving, therefore,  an aggregated model appears to perform quite 
adequately. Revenues calculated under the first-dollar assumption of zero 
contributions were $260.2 billion in 1980. Calculated tax revenues under 
this assumption using the 1983 law were $279.6 billion. In order to make 
comparisons among constant revenue alternatives, tax rates under other 
hypothetical  tax laws were adjusted proportionally so as to yield that 
same revenue for 1983. In all cases, adjustments were made so that tax 
credits and tax-credit rates were unaffected. The adjustment process thus 
affects tax liabilities before credits as well as marginal tax rates. 
Because it was the latest available year with data for contributions by 
itemizers, 1980 was used as the base year for simulating changes in contri- 
butions. The various price and income values implied by hypothetical tax 
policies were compared to the actual 1980 values of price and income ac- 
cording to the basic simulation expression: 
(25)  G83  = G80  (p83/p80)”  (  Y83/Y80)b, 
where both income measures and 1980 giving are expressed in 1983 dollars. 
One special feature of the 1980 tax law that makes an important differ- 
ence in calculation of PSO  is the “maximum tax on earned income” that ap- 
plied in that year. This feature had the effect of  reducing the marginal tax 
rate applicable to deductions for most taxpayers in tax brackets over 50 
percent. Thus the price difference brought about by the reduction in maxi- 
mum rates from 70 to 50 percent in 1981 was not as great as it would first 
appear. 
In order to calculate the effective marginal tax rate under the maximum 
tax, it is necessary to consider the provision’s allocation of taxable income 
into “earned” and “unearned” portions. Under the maximum tax, the lat- 
ter was “stacked” on top of the former so as to be taxed at the same rates 
that would have applied in the absence of this provision. Where E  is the 
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aries plus certain business income), TZso  is the maximum taxable income 
subject to the 50 percent tax rate, TZis total taxable income, and TAX ( ) is 
the income-tax-schedule function, the tax liability under the maximum 
tax was 
(26)  TAX(TZ~~)  + SO  (ETI-TI~~)  + [TAX(TZ)  - TAX(ETZ)]. 
Differentiating (26) with respect to charitable contributions shows that 
the decrease in taxes due to an additional dollar of deductions-that  is, 
the effective marginal tax rate-is: 
(27)  m -  (me -  SO)€, 
where m  is the marginal tax rate on total taxable income and me  is the mar- 
ginal tax rate on earned taxable income. This rate was calculated for ap- 
plicable high-income taxpayers using the average proportion of earned in- 
come for the class.27 
The price of giving is defined as a weighted average of the price of mak- 
ing cash gifts and the estimated price of giving appreciated assets: 
(28)  PI, = 9d1  -mJ  + (1 -  9,)(1 -  m,,  -  0.5 mc,,), 
where 6,  is the proportion of contributions made in the form of  cash by 
the income class, m,,  and mc,, are the marginal tax rates on ordinary and 
capital gains income, respectively, and 0.5 represents the expected present 
value of the realized gains per dollar of asset value.28 
Two alternative sets of  estimated parameters are used in the simula- 
tions. The first, based on the constant-elasticity model estimated for the 
1975 tax file, uses a constant-price elasticity of -1.27 and an income elas- 
ticity of 0.78. The second estimated model is the translog variable-elastic- 
ity form, which allows both the price and income elasticities to vary by in- 
come level. Calculated at the means of rather broad income classes, as 
shown in table 2.16, the price elasticity varies from -0.42 to -1.51 while the 
income elasticity varies from 0.55 to 0.91. The variation in incomes in the 
1980 data base used in the current chapter is greater, resulting in a positive 
implied price elasticity at the very lowest income level. In the simulations 
based on this model, therefore, the price elasticity is constrained to have a 
maximum value of zero. 
3.4.3  Simulation Results 
Before presenting a comparison of alternative proposals, it is useful to 
begin by examining the base years used for comparison. Table 3.6 pre- 
27. Using the maximum rates allowed by the provision, the model calculated earned in- 
come as wages plus 30 percent of the sum of income from small businesses. See Lindsey 1981 
for a thorough treatment of the effect of this provision on tax rates. 
28. For further discussion of the definition of the price of contributing appreciated assets, 
see chapter 2, especially equation (7). 124  Contributions by  Individuals 
Table 3.6  Comparison of Itemization Rate, Price of Giving and Contributions 
between 1980 and 1983 
1980  1983 
Actual  Estimated 
Percentage itemizing 




Contributions ($ billions, 
1983 dollars) 
Total 
TOP 5 income classesb 
31.0  34.0 
0.69  0.74 
1  .oo  1  .oo 
0.90  0.91 
Constant  Variable 
Elasticities  Elasticities 
47.2  a  45.1  45.2 
11.2  9.2  8.6 
a$38.7 billion in 1980 dollars. 
bOver $50,000 in 1980. 
sents aggregate data on itemization, the price of giving, and contributions 
for 1980 and the corresponding simulated values for 1983. Three major 
changes occurred between these years to influence contributions: the pro- 
portion of taxpayers who itemized deductions went up, the top marginal 
tax rates were substantially cut, and real incomes fell. One major result 
was that the average price faced by  itemizers increased from 0.69  to 
0.74-reflecting  sharp increases at upper incomes-and  the overall aver- 
age price rbse from 0.90 to 0.91. Based on the projections of incomes and 
prices, total contributions measured in 1983 dollars are estimated using 
constant elasticities to fall from $47.2 billion in 1980 to $45.1 billion in 
1983, a decline of 4 percent. The decline is slightly greater using the vari- 
able-elasticity model. Due to the steep price increases at upper income lev- 
els, contributions made by taxpayers in the top five income classes (over 
$50,000 in 1980) are projected to decrease by a substantially greater de- 
gree. Using the constant-elasticity model, the estimated decrease in giving 
by this group was 18 percent, to $9.2 billion; the decrease was 23 percent, 
to $8.6 billion, using variable elasticities. The simulation of  changes in 
giving over time, including changes in the 1980-83 period, is discussed in 
more detail in the following section. The simulations discussed in the re- 
mainder of this section use 1983 values-corresponding  to  two sets of elas- 
ticity assumptions-as  a basis for comparison among alternative tax rules. 
Aggregate Giving 
Table 3.7 presents the aggregate simulation results for 1983. For the 
1983 law and each of nine proposed variants, the table gives estimated ag- 125  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
gregate contributions under the alternative assumptions regarding price 
and income elasticities. The table also shows the adjustment factor neces- 
sary to obtain revenues equal to the 1983 tax law as well as the average 
price of  giving faced by itemizers and nonitemizers under each proposal. 
As noted above, the average price of giving in 1983 was 0.74 for itemizers. 
Nonitemizers could deduct 25 percent of gifts up to $100, but the price of 
contributions above this level was  1 .O.  Since average contributions by 
nonitemizers would have exceeded $100 without the deduction even in the 
lowest income class, this limited deduction  had very little effect at the 
margin. Thus the price for nonitemizers was set at 1 .O. 
Three proposals involve possible extensions of the basic charitable de- 
duction. The most generous of these is a 150 percent multiple deduction. 
Because it would entail a significant drop in taxable incomes, it would re- 
quire a 7 percent across-the-board increase in tax rates in order to raise 
revenue equal to the 1983 law. The estimated increase in giving, to $63.8 
billion under the constant-elasticity assumption, indicates the strength of 
this price incentive, especially at upper incomes. A more likely multiple- 
deduction scheme would be one that extends the added incentive primarily 
to low- and middle-income taxpayers. The graduated multiple deduction 
shown in table 3.7, recommended by the Commission on Private Philan- 
thropy and Public Needs, would allow a 200 percent deduction for those 
with incomes under $15,000 and a 150 percent deduction for those with in- 
comes between $1 5,000 and $30,000. If applied in 1983 this deduction rule 
would cause an increase in contributions of $1.8 billion or $0.9  billion, de- 
pending  on the  elasticity  assumption.  Because  the  constant-elasticity 
model implies a larger price responsiveness for lower-income taxpayers, 
that model produces bigger changes for policies with their primary impact 
at lower levels. The third possible expansion of the deduction is its exten- 
sion to nonitemizers, without limit, as provided in the 1981 tax act for 
1986. This change reduces the average price of giving faced by nonitem- 
izers from 1 .O to 0.86. The overall increase in giving is $5.7 billion or $3.4 
billion, depending on the elasticity assumption used. In order to maintain 
the level of revenues, tax rates would have to be increased by about 1 per- 
cent under the graduated deduction and about 2 percent under the exten- 
sion to nonitemizers. 
Proposals to limit the charitable deduction range from the elimination 
of the special treatment of gifts of appreciated assets to the outright elimi- 
nation of the deduction. The constructive realization of capital gains on 
donated assets would cause a small increase in the price of giving for item- 
izers (0.739 to 0.744) and a decline in total giving of less than $1 billion. 
Eliminating the deduction altogether would have a sizable impact on total 
giving, however. Under the constant-elasticity assumption, contributions 
would fall by $11.8 billion, from $45.1 to $33.3 billion. This 26 percent 
drop is the same percentage predicted by Feldstein and Taylor (1976) and Table 3.7  Simulation Totals for 1983: Revenue, Price of Giving, Contributions 
Tax Law or Proposal 
Average Price of Givinga  Contributions (billions) 
Revenue  Constant  Variable 
Adjustment  I temizers  Nonitemizers  Elasticities  Elasticities 
1983 law  -  0.74  1 .oo  $45.1  $45.2 
Expansion of the charitable deduction 
150 percent multiple deduction  1.07 
Graduated multiple deduction  1.01 
Extension to nonitemizers  1.02 
Limitation of the charitable deduction 
Constructive realization  on gifts of 
Elimination of  deduction 
appreciated assets  1 .oo 
0.97 
0.62  1 .oo  63.8 
0.69  1 .oo  46.9 







Substitution of tax credit for deduction 
30 percent  1.02  0.72  0.79  50.4 
20 percent  1 .oo  0.81  0.86  43.3 
Flat-rate tax 
On adjusted gross income plus excluded 
On taxable income (20.7%)'  - 
long-term gains (13.6%)'  - 
0.80  1 .oo  39.8 











aWeighted by number of returns. 
bThere is no distinction between itemizers and nonitemizers under this proposal. 
'Tax  rates shown in parentheses are after revenue adjustment. Original tax rates were 19.5 and 11.8 percent for the last two simulations. Calculated revenue 
adjustment factors were 1.06 and 1.15. 127  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) using very similar models but disaggregated 
data. Using variable elasticities, however, the decrease is only $9.1 billion, 
or about 20 percent. While both declines are certainly large, the difference 
between these two simulations illustrates the importance of the underlying 
econometric model. 
The results of substituting a general tax credit for the present deduction 
were simulated using tax-credit rates of 20 and 30 percent. Either change, 
of course, would reduce the price faced by nonitemizers paying some tax; 
unless the credit was refundable, the price for nontaxable returns would 
be one. The prices faced by an itemizer might increase or decrease, de- 
pending on his marginal tax rate. Under the 20 percent credit, contribu- 
tions would fall about 4 percent to $43.3 billion using constant elasticities 
and 7 percent to $42.2 billion using variable elasticities. Giving under the 
30 percent credit would rise, however, by  12 or 3 percent, depending on 
the model used. The relatively large difference between the two basic mod- 
els for the tax credits illustrates the importance of the variation in as- 
sumed price responsiveness among income classes. The constant-elasticity 
model-based  on an estimate from a sample heavily weighted with high- 
income taxpayers-implies  considerable price responsiveness among low- 
income nonitemizers. The variable elasticity form, on the other hand, im- 
plies  a much  smaller price response at the lower  end.  The tax credit 
highlights this difference because of its effect on the price faced by low-in- 
come taxpayers. 
The final two simulations shown are for more general tax changes, both 
in the direction of a “flat-rate” tax. The base for the first is taxable in- 
come as defined in 1983. Because this base excludes exemptions ($1000 
each) and the zero-bracket amount, this tax would be progressive at lower 
income levels and nearly proportional at upper income levels. The second 
tax uses a much broader income base, adjusted gross income plus the ex- 
cluded portion of long-term capital gains; it would be much closer to a 
truly proportional levy than the first variant. The flat-rate tax on taxable 
income would lower the price for those itemizers with marginal tax rates 
formerly below the new rate (about 21 percent) and would raise the price 
for taxpayers whose marginal tax rates were reduced.29  The net effect in 
1983 would be to raise the average price faced by itemizers from 0.74 to 
0.80. Total contributions would fall to $39.8 billion, using the constant- 
elasticity assumption.  The simulated effect on contributions would  be 
much more extreme if gross income were the tax base, because contribu- 
tions would lose their deductibility altogether. In this case, total contribu- 
tions are projected to fall to $33.0 billion or $36.0 billion, depending on 
the parameter assumption. 
29. The original rate multiplied by the adjustment rate was (.195) (1.06) = .207. 128  Contributions by Individuals 
For each of the simulated totals forgiving shown in table 3.7, there is an 
associated prediction error. Table 3.8 gives the 95 percent confidence in- 
tervals corresponding to predictions for three tax regimes. Where sp2  is the 
prediction error, defined in equation (6) and calculated using the variance- 
covariance matrix of the estimates underlying the simulations, the 95 per- 
cent confidence interval is 1.96 6  above and below the point estimate 
calculated for each representative taxpayer. Since the equations were esti- 
mated  in logarithmic form, the intervals are slightly asymmetric when 
converted to dollars. For example, the prediction interval corresponding 
to the estimate for the elimination of the deduction, based on constant 
elasticities, is $32.2 billion to $34.5 billion, implying a range about 7 per- 
cent the size of the point estimate. The interval corresponding to the vari- 
able-elasticity formulation is relatively larger-1  3 percent of the point es- 
timate. Owing to the smaller changes in prices and incomes implied by the 
20 percent tax credit and the graduated multiple deduction, the prediction 
intervals for these proposals tend to be smaller. Using the constant-elastic- 
ity form, the 95 percent confidence interval for the 20 percent tax credit is 
$41.9 to $44.6 billion, or 6 percent of the point estimate. The interval for 
the graduated multiple deduction is 4 percent of its point estimate. For 
comparison, the prediction intervals for the 1983 law are given also. These 
intervals are the smallest of all because of the similarity of the 1983 tax 
schedule to that of the base year, 1980. 
Table 3.8  Prediction Intervals at 95 Percent Level for Selected Simulations 
Interval as 
Total Contributions (billions)  Percentage 
Point  Lower  Upper  of Point 
Estimate  Bound  Bound  Estimate 
Elimination of deduction 
Constant elasticities 
Variable elasticities 
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Distributional Eflects 
The various proposals would influence contributions to different de- 
grees throughout the distribution of income. In order to illustrate the po- 
tential variation in distributional impact, table 3.9 shows the changes in 
net income and giving by income class resulting from three proposals. The 
simulations shown assume constant income and price elasticities. The 
elimination of the deduction-with  the accompanying overall rate reduc- 
tion-would  cause some redistribution of income away from high-income 
taxpayers. The contributions of all itemizers who pay tax would fall, with 
those in higher tax brackets having the largest reductions. So great is the 
implied increase in price at the upper end that contributions for taxpayers 
making more than about $60,000 would fall by over 50 percent in the long 
run. There is a similar, but less dramatic, redistribution in giving project- 
ed under a flat-rate tax on taxable income. Although this tax would sub- 
stantially redistribute income from lower- to upper-income taxpayers, the 
price increases at the top would more than offset these income gains, re- 
sulting in decreases of over 35 percent in contributions for taxpayers in the 
top four brackets. These results, of course, are dependent upon the specif- 
ic values used for price and income elasticities. A sufficiently large income 
effect combined with a smaller price effect could imply increases, rather 
than decreases, in contributions at the highest income levels. 
The third policy simulated in table 3.9 is a graduated multiple deduc- 
tion, allowing itemizers with incomes below $15,000 to deduct twice the 
amount of their contributions and those with incomes between $1 5,000 
and $30,000 to deduct 150 percent. Of course there is little effect on tax- 
payers above $30,000, except for the small impact of  the increased tax 
rates made necessary by the change. Increases in contributions for taxpay- 
ers making between $6000 and $30,000 are quite large, however. These 
simulations show that the distributional impact of tax policies may vary 
markedly. Because donors at different income levels differ in their giving 
patterns, such distributional effects are central in assessing the effect of 
tax changes on charitable support for different kinds of  organizations 
within the nonprofit sector. 
3.4.4  Contributions by Type of  Donee 
It is possible to combine the aggregate and distributional impact of tax 
changes to estimate the effect on contributions by type of organization. 
As discussed above, the patterns of giving to various types of  organiza- 
tions vary significantly by income level. In order to reflect such giving pat- 
terns, the percentage distribution of gifts observed in the National Study 
of Philanthropy, in real terms, was applied to the various simulated out- 
comes for 1983. Table 3.10 gives the estimated percentage change in total 
contributions to each donee group based on this distribution. Provisions Table 3.9  Distributional  Effects of Tax Changes: Illustrations  for Three Tax Proposals (percentage  change compared to 1983 law) 
Income 
(thousands) 
Elimination of  Flat Rate on  Graduated Multiple 
Deduction  Taxable Income  Deduction 
Income  Giving  Income  Giving  Income  Giving 
$0 under 6.1 
$6.1 under 12.2 
$12.2 under 18.3 
$18.3 under 24.3 
$24.3 under 30.4 
$30.4 under 36.5 
$36.5 under 60.9 
$60.9 under 121.7 
$121.7 under 243.4 
$243.4 under 608.5 
$608.5 under 1217 




+  0.2 




-  0.2 
-0.1 
-  0.3 
-  1.0 




-  9.2 
-  13.0 
-  17.5 
-  24.3 
-  33.6 
-51.0 
-  59.5 
-  62.8 





-  3.8 
-  3.2 
-  2.7 
-  1.6 









-  0.2 
-2.1 
-  2.7 
-  9.0 
-  14.3 
-31.8 
-  38.0 
-  38.2 
-  38.3 
-  38.2 
-  11.8 
0 
0 
+  0.2 
+0.1 




-  0.2 
-  0.2 
-  0.2 










-  0.2 
-  0.3 
-  0.3 
-  0.3 
+ 3.9 
Note: Simulations use constant-price elasticity of -  1.27 and income elasticity of 0.78. Table 3.10  Simulated Long-Run Changes in Giving by Type of Organization, as Percentage of 1983 Levels 
Educational 
Percentage Difference from  Combined 
1983 Law  Total  Religious  Higher  Other  Appeals  Medical  Cultural  Other 
150 percent deduction 
Graduated multiple 
Extension to nonitemizers 
Constructive realization on 
gifts of appreciated assets 
Elimination of deduction 
20 percent tax credit 
30 percent tax credit 
Flat tax on taxable income 
Flat tax on adjusted gross 
income plus excluded 
long-term gains 
deduction 


















-  26 
-4 
+ 12 







-  50 
-  35 
-  24 
-  30 
-6 
-  52 
-  37 
-  25 
-  31 
-3 
-  36 
-  16 
-I 
-  19 
-3 
-  34 
-  14 
0 
-  18 
-8 
-  58 
-  44 
-  34 
-  36 
-3 
-  37 
-  18 
-4 
-  19 
-  27  -  23  -  46  -  47  -  34  -  33  -  51  -  35 
Note:  Simulations use constant-price elasticity of -  1.27 and income elasticity of  0.78. 132  Contributions by Individuals 
that affect giving at lower incomes tend to have their major effect on sup- 
port for religious groups; provisions with large impacts 9n giving by those 
at upper incomes show up primarily in support for educational and cul- 
tural  institutions.  For  example,  the  graduated  multiple  deduction- 
shown in table 3.9 to produce large increases in giving at incomes below 
$30,000-increases  religious giving by 5 percent, more than the change in 
any other category. In contrast, eliminating the deduction has its major 
impact at the top of the income scale. Consequently, giving to higher edu- 
cation is predicted to fall by 50 percent in the long run. These estimates 
show that the distributional character of  tax changes are important, al- 
though aggregate effects on giving predominate. A rising tide of giving 
would tend to lift all boats, though by different amounts. 
Needless to say, the assumptions concerning the distributional patterns 
of giving lie at the heart of such simulations. It is useful, therefore, to 
compare these results with a similar set using an alternative distribution- 
that based on the tabulation of contributions made on 1962 tax returns. 
As shown in table 3.2, these distributions are based on different methods 
and types of data and yield somewhat different conclusions. Table 3.11 
summarizes their implications for the distribution of gifts in 1983 as well 
as the effects of three tax changes. The allocation of  the $45 billion total 
of  giving for 1983 based on the National Study of  Philanthropy data 
shows quite a high estimate of religious giving, but its estimates for giving 
to educational institutions are much more in line with other estimates of 
receipts by nonprofit organizations. Considering the separate origins and 
dates of the two distributions, these distributions are remarkably compa- 
rable. 'O'In.any  case, the percentage changes for comparable categories for 
the two distributions are quite close, which suggests that the general thrust 
of results like those in table 3.10 will tend to hold up under different spe- 
cific distributional .assumptions. 
3.5  Simulations of Changes in Giving over Time 
One useful application of  the simulation techniques discussed in this 
chapter is to assess the effects on giving of inflation and tax changes over 
time. Any change that affects marginal tax rates, real net income, or the 
number of taxpayers who itemize their deductions will tend to affect giv- 
ing behavior. Thus, contributions may be influenced by  legislated revi- 
sions in the tax schedule or by inflationary bracket creep. In fact, the ef- 
30. The estimates of religious giving differ by $5.7 billion. The lower estimate of $28.4 bil- 
lion is close to the Giving U.S.A.  estimate of religious giving for the previous year ($28.1 bil- 
lion) and probably would be nearer the 1983 figure. The education figure based on the 1962 
distribution ($1.6 billion) may be compared to the estimate of giving by individuals to higher 
education in 1981-82 ($2.3 billion). The latter includes a good portion of bequests, but does 
not include other education (Giving U.S.A.  1983, pp. 38, 54). Table 3.11  Estimates of Giving Implied by Two Distributions of Giving by Type of Organization 
Percentage Change in Contributions from 1983 due to: 
Level of  Extension of 
Contributions,  Deduction to  20 Percent  Flat tax on 
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-  35 
-  37 
-  16 
-  14 
-  44 




-  30 
-  30 
-  11 
-4 
-8 
-  30 
-31 
-  19 
-  18 
-  36 
-  19 
-  12 
-9 
-  13 
-  27 
-  27 
-  16 
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fects of  such  changes may  be  far more  important than the  potential 
impact of provisions specifically directed towards contributions. This sec- 
tion presents two applications of simulation techniques that highlight the 
effects of inflation and general tax changes. The first is  a retrospective 
look at the period  1948 to 1980 focused on the effect  of  inflation and 
changes in the standard deduction on the proportion of  taxpayers who 
itemize their deductions. The second uses the behavioral relationships dis- 
cussed in this chapter with forecasts of inflation and income growth to 
predict future giving. 
3.5.1  Inflation, the Standard Deduction, and Itemization,  1948-80 
Since the first debates in Congress over its introduction in the 194Os, the 
standard deduction has been recognized as a potential threat to charitable 
contributions. Taxpayers who elect it receive no incremental tax reduction 
with increases in giving, making the net price of giving equal to one.3i 
Concern over the effect of the standard deduction has reemerged in recent 
discussions of  tax policy toward charitable giving. Spokesmen for the 
nonprofit sector have argued that the extensions of the standard deduc- 
tion after 1970 and the conversion to a flat, zero-bracket amount in 1978 
have significantly reduced the number  of  itemizers, thus discouraging 
charitable giving.’* From 1970 to 1980 the maximum standard deduction 
for married couples was increased from $1000 to $3400, an increase of 74 
percent after inflation. Over the same period the proportion of taxpayers 
who itemized fell from 48 to 31 percent.”  What has been the effect of such 
changes on giving? 
In order.  to assess the importance of changes in the standard deduction, 
actual rates of itemization and giving are compared to estimates of the 
corresponding rates that would have been observed had the standard de- 
duction been indexed in real terms. Had the maximum standard deduc- 
tion been indexed at its 1948 level ($1888 in 1972 dollars), for example, the 
nominal maximum would have risen from $1000 in 1948 to $3372 in 1980. 
If  the 1970 value ($1093 in 1972 dollars) were the benchmark, however, 
the  maximum-standard-deduction levels  would  be  only  58  percent  as 
large. These two values are used to produce two alternative simulations. 
For each alternative, the proportion of taxpayers who would have item- 
ized was estimated using the logistical function given in equation (16), 
with an elasticity of 1.24. Since there is no change in the price and net-in- 
31. This is of course true for those who owe no tax. Thus changes in exemption levels will 
affect contributions to the extent that the prices and tax liabilities of taxpayers are changed. 
32. See, for example, the statement of Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, a cosponsor of a bill 
to extend the charitable deduction to nonitemizers.  In part he stated: “The problem, of 
course, is that as fewer and fewer taxpayers ‘itemize,’ the purpose of the charitable deduc- 
tion is steadily eroded and its incentive effect attenuated” (U.S. Congress, Senate 1980, p. 
21). 
33. See table 2.6. 135  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
come values facing itemizers and nonitemizers in a given income and fam- 
ily-status category, simulated changes in giving arise only from the pro- 
portion of iternizer~.’~ 
Table 3.12 presents the actual and simulated values for the percentage 
of itemizers and total giving for even years between 1948 and 1980.35  The 
simulations based on the indexed 1948 value show that this large standard 
deduction would have reduced the number  of itemizers in comparison 
with actual levels in most years. For example, only an estimated 37 per- 
cent of taxpayers would have itemized in 1970 had the 1948 standard de- 
duction been maintained in real terms. As a result, contributions in most 
years would have been smaller than they were in fact. For the low 1970 
standard deduction, the reverse is true. Had the 1970 real value been in ef- 
fect, more taxpayers would have itemized and contributions would have 
been higher. 
These calculations show two clear effects: contributions were stimulat- 
ed by the erosion in the real value of the maximum standard deduction be- 
tween 1948 and 1970 and contributions were discouraged by the large in- 
creases in the maximum after 1970. The year 1970 marked an historic low 
point in the value of the maximum standard deduction. If 1970 is used as 
the point of reference, the tax structure in 1980 appears to be relatively un- 
favorable toward charitable giving, as suggested by  spokesmen for the 
nonprofit sector. If 1948 is used as the benchmark, however, it can be seen 
that  the  maximum  standard deduction  is  virtually unchanged  in  real 
terms. 
3.5.2  Inflation and the Impact of  the 1981 Tax Act 
In this section the basic behavioral model is used to make projections of 
giving. The model described here projects values of giving to 1986 based 
on 1980 basic data, projections of  economic variables,  and legislated 
changes in the income tax. This kind of model is probably the most peril- 
ous kind of simulation exercise because it produces values of future giving 
34. Average contributions by year and income class for itemizers were obtained from re- 
ported tax deductions in the Statistics of  Income. Average contributions by nonitemizers are 
based on means by income class taken from the National Study of Philanthropy, adjusted 
for price changes. While itemizers and nonitemizers are by no means homogenous groups, 
this simulation method recognizes no difference among these in every group. Lags in adjust- 
ment, for example, are not taken into account, and this is a drawback where changes in item- 
ization status are particularly rapid. 
The appropriate income class was determined by converting average income for the class 
into 1973  dollars. The average giving obtained in the 1973 survey for the coresponding class 
was then reconverted into the appropriate year’s prices. The 1973 values of average giving 
for nonitemizers are a smoothed series based on Morgan, Dye, and Hybels (1977, p. 193, ta- 
ble24). See Clotfelter and Salamon 1982, p. 186, table 3. 
35. By way of comparison, the estimates of actual total giving tend to be somewhat higher 
than estimates of the trade publication Giving U.S.A. before 1974 and then slightly lower 
after that. The estimate of $39.1 billion for total giving in 1980 differs from the figure of 
$39.9 billion in that publication by about 2 percent (1983, p. 36). Table 3.12  Individual Contributions and Itemization: Actual Levels and Simulations for Indexed Maximum Standard Deductions 
Simulated Levels Assuming Real Maximum Standard  Deduction Fixed at: 
Estimates of 
Actual Levels  1948 Level  1970 Level 
Maximum 
Standard 
Deduction  Percentage  Percentage 
Difference 
Year  Dollars  Itemizers  Giving  Itemizers  Giving  from Actual  ltemizers  Giving  from Actual 
1948  1888  16.4  4.0  16.4  4.0  0  26.8  4.6  + 14 
1950  1867  18.8  4.5  18.6  4.5  0  29.8  5.1  + 14 
1952  1726  22.1  5.6  20.4  5.5  -2  32.0  6.3  + 12 
1954  1679  27.1  6.3  24.6  6.1  -3  37.1  7.0  + 11 
1956  1593  31.4  7.5  27.6  7.2  -4  40.5  8.1  +9 
1958  1514  35.5  8.3  30.3  7.9  -4  43.4  8.9  +6 
1960  1455  39.7  9.3  33.6  8.8  -5  46.7  9.8  +5 
1962  1416  42.5  10.1  35.7  9.6  -5  48.7  10.5  +1 
1964  1374  41.4  11.2  34.2  10.6  -5  46.7  11.6  +4 
1966  1303  40.9  12.5  32.8  11.8  -5  44.9  12.8  +2 
1968  1212  43.7  14.9  34.2  14.2  -5  45.9  15.1  +1 
1970  1093  48.0  16.4  36.9  15.4  -6  48.0  16.4  0 
1972  2000  35.0  19.0  36.1  19.1  +1  47.0  20.4  +7 
1974  1738  35.7  21.8  34.1  21.7  -1  44.6  22.9  +5 
1976  21 15  30.8  32.8  25.7  25.7  +I  42.7  27.5  +8 
1978  2260  28.7  30.7  31.4  31.3  +2  40.4  33.2  +8 
1980  1897  31.0  39.1  31.2  39.1  0  40.3  41.2  +5 
in 1972  Percentage  Total  Percentage  Total  Difference  Percentage  Total 137  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
simply on the basis of  anticipated statutory and economic variables. No 
basic changes in behavior-by  donors or charitable organizations-is  re- 
flected. The results therefore must be viewed as a conditional prediction- 
an estimate of the likely outcome of tax and economic changes, holding 
other things constant. 
Two steps are involved in this calculation. First, basic data on income 
and number of taxpayers by tax status are “aged” using economic projec- 
tions to yield likely levels for each succeeding year. For example, gross in- 
come is assumed to grow at the rate projected for per capita GNP. Based 
on these quantities and the actual or hypothetical tax schedules applying 
to each year, taxes and marginal tax rates can be calculated. If the price 
level rises at a faster rate than the growth in tax bracket limits, “bracket 
creep” will tend to raise marginal tax rates for taxpayers at a given real in- 
come. In addition, changes in the percentage of taxpayers itemizing their 
deductions  are projected  using the model  summarized  in  (16) above. 
Based on marginal tax rates and projections  of  itemization status, the 
price of giving is calculated. The second basic step in the simulation is to 
estimate giving using a behavioral model embodying changes in net in- 
come and price. The model used is based on the assumption of incomplete 
adjustment and takes the form of  equation (20), where the coefficient of 
adjustment is 0.37. Desired long-run giving takes the constant-elasticity 
form summarized in equation (21), where the price elasticity is -1.27 and 
the income elasticity is 0.78. 
The basic data used for this projection model were tabulations for 1980 
individual tax returns. Projections of  inflation and income growth were 
taken from the 1984 federal budget. These assumptions are summarized 
in the first two columns of table 3. 13.36  Taxes and giving were calculated 
separately for twelve income classes, joint and nonjoint returns, and for 
itemizers and nonitemizers, resulting in forty-eight separate calculations 
for each year. The model’s simulations reflect four major tax changes: the 
institution of a 50 percent top marginal tax rate in 1982, a 23 percent pro- 
portional reduction in other tax rates over three years, a phased-in chari- 
table deduction for nonitemizers becoming a full deduction in 1986, and a 
general indexation of tax brackets beginning in 1985. Because the model 
36. Gross national product projections were: 2938 (1981), 3058 (1982), 3262 (1983), 3566 
(1984), 3890 (1985), and 4232 (1986). GNP deflator projections were:  195.5 (1981), 207.2 
(1982), 218.1 (1983), 229.4 (1984), 240.6 (1985), and 251.7 (1986) (U.S. Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget 1983, pp. 2-9,2-10).  Over the period 1980  to 1986 these projections imply 
an average exponential growth rate of  7.9 percent for national income and 5.7 for prices. 
Wherepl andpl  are price levels in period 1 and t, the exponential rate is rin the expressionp, 
= po exp(rt). 
An exponential rate of 0.01064 was calculated for population growth from estimates of 
U.S. population in 1978 and 1981 of 222.585 and 229.805 million, respectively (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census 1982, p. 2). Taken together, these economic assumptions imply growth in real 
per capita income of about 1 percent a year. Table 3.13  Simulations of Individual Giving, 1981-86 
Percentage Given by 
Taxpayers 
Total Contributions  with 
Assumed Increase  (billions)  Incomes 
from 1980 in  Percentage  Current  1980  over $50,000 
Year  Income  Prices  Itemizing  Dollars  Dollars  Itemizers  in 1980 
~~~  ~ 
1980  -  -  31.0  38.7  38.7  66.8  23.8 
1981  11.6  9.4  32.6  42.9  39.2  67.9  22.6 
1982  16.1  16.0  33.1  44.9  38.7  67.6  21.4 
1983  23.9  22.1  34.0  47.2  38.6  67.9  20.3 
1984  35.4  28.4  35.3  50.5  39.3  68.2  19.4 
1985  47.7  34.7  35.7  54.6  40.6  67.4  18.6 
1986  60.7  40.9  36.2  60.5  42.9  65.5  17.9 139  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
was designed to project actual levels of giving, no adjustment in revenues 
or tax rates were made as in the model described in section 3.4. The price 
of giving is a weighted average of the prices applying to gifts of cash and 
of appreciated assets, as given in equation (28). As in the previous models 
presented in this chapter, contributions by  nonitemizers were based on 
data from the National Study of Philanthropy. 
Table 3.13 summarizes the basic simulation results as well as the eco- 
nomic assumptions underlying them. The model implies that the percent- 
age of taxpayers who itemize their deductions will rise from 31 percent in 
1980 to over 35 percent in 1984, most of this being due to the erosion in the 
real value of the zero-bracket amount during this period. After 1984 this 
proportion continues to climb slightly due to growth in real per capita in- 
come. In order to reflect the effects of tax changes on the distribution of 
giving, the last column shows the percentage of  gifts made by taxpayers 
with incomes over $50,000 in 1980-roughly  the most affluent 3.4 percent 
of   taxpayer^.^' In the estimates of giving for 1982 and 1983 the effect of 
the reduction  in top marginal tax rates  is  evident. Total giving drops 
slightly in real terms, to about $39 billion in both years, and the propor- 
tion of gifts made by the top income group falls from 23 to 20 percent over 
two years.’* Although the reduction in top rates became effective in 1982, 
the model’s incomplete-adjustment mechanism tends to spread out the ef- 
fect over several years. For the income groups below the top marginal tax 
rates, the legislated tax reductions are offset to varying degrees by infla- 
tion-induced bracket creep.39  Beginning in 1984 contributions are projected 
to increase in real terms, corresponding to the expansion of the charitable 
deduction for nonitemizers. By  1986, when the full deduction is scheduled 
to become effective, total giving is projected to rise to $60.5 billion, some 
11  percent above the 1983 level in real 
In concluding, it is useful to compare these simulations with the most 
recent data on charitable contributions. Before doing so, though, the un- 
certain nature of  estimates such as these bears reemphasizing. Not only 
are the estimates subject to the kind of statistical errors described in sec- 
tion 3.3, they are also vulnerable to errors in the projection of basic eco- 
nomic variables that underlie them. It is possible to make a partial assess- 
ment of  the accuracy of these simulations by examining recent tax return 
data that became available after the simulations were carried out. Accord- 
ing to official data for 1981 and preliminary data for 1982, contributions 
by itemizers increased from $25.8 billion in 1980 to $26.4 billion and $33.8 
37. This group comprises the top six income brackets. 
38. By comparison, the estimates of total individual contributions in Giving U.S.A.  are 
39. See Clotfelter 1984 for a discussion of inflation, tax cuts, and marginal tax rates. 
40. A deduction for 25 percent of the first $100 of contributions was allowed for nonite- 
mizers in 1982 and 1983, but this has little effect at the margin since average giving for noni- 
temizers in every income class exceeded $100. 
$44.6and $48.7 billion in 1981 and 1982, respectively (1983, p. 36). 140  Contributions by Individuals 
billion in  1981 and 1982, respectively (U.S.  Internal Revenue Service, 
Statistics of Income-1981,  Individual Income Tax Returns 1983  p. 54, ta- 
ble 2.1; Epstein 1983-84, p. 19). In comparison, the simulated totals for 
itemized giving in  1981 and 1982 were $29.2 billion and $30.3 billion, 
amounts that erred by about 10 percent in opposite directions. Analysis of 
the difference for 1982 shows that actual income growth was stronger 
than projected,  and the simulated proportion and number of itemizers 
were about 7 percent lower than actual levels. The projections for contri- 
butions in 1982 thus understate the contributions by itemizers and over- 
state the contributions by nonitemizers,  resulting in a probable under- 
statement of the total. As for the pattern of giving by income class, the 
simulation model appears to  have anticipated the effect of the 1981 tax cut 
quite well. Table 3.14 shows the change in average giving by income level 
between  1981 and 1982. In contrast to the modest increases in contribu- 
tions  at incomes  below  $50,000, the  average  giving  rates  above the 
$200,000 income level decreased sharply, revealing the impact of reducing 
the top tax rate from 70 to 50 percent. While some of this drop in high-in- 
come giving may be due to transitory price effects-with  taxpayers mak- 
ing some gifts early in order to take advantage of the higher deduction 
rate-the  econometric evidence  on charitable giving suggests that  the 
change in tax schedule will have a lasting effect on giving behavior. 
Beyond  the question  of  accuracy  in projecting  total contributions, 
therefore, simulation models such as that used here are useful in identify- 
ing major trends in future giving. The current simulation model suggests 
that individual  contributions  will  likely increase in real terms between 
1980 and 1986, due largely to  an expansion in the number of itemizers and 
Table 3.14  Average Contributions by Itemizers, 1981 and 1982 
Average Contributions  Percentage 
Income  1981  1982  Change 
Under $5,000 
$5,000 under 10,000 
$10,00Ounder 15,000 
$15,000 under 20,000 
$20,000 under 25,000 
$25,000 under 30,000 
$30,000 under 50,000 
$50,000 under 100,000 
$100,000  under 200,000 
$200,000  under 500,000 
$500,000 under 1  ,000,000 


































-  16 
-  33 
-  28 
Source: U.  S.  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1981.  Individual Income Tax 
Returns, 1983, pp. 53-54, table 2.1; Epstein 1984, p. 19, table I. 141  Simulating Effects of Tax Policies 
the planned  introduction of the charitable deduction  for nonitemizers. 
Due to the latter provision as well as to the nature of the tax rate reduc- 
tions, however, the distribution of giving will be altered with those in up- 
per income classes giving a smaller share of the total. Based on past pat- 
terns of  contributions by type of  charity, these changes suggest that gifts 
to religious institutions and health and welfare agencies will rise relative to 
gifts to  cultural and educational institutions. 
3.6  Conclusion 
This  chapter discusses  the application  of  econometric  estimates of 
charitable giving in simulating the effects of  alternative tax provisions. 
Models have been presented that simulate the effects of hypothetical tax 
provisions in a given year, the effects of past taxes on past giving, and the 
effects of  legislated changes on future giving. A basic point made in the 
chapter is that contributions may be influenced either by tax provisions 
explicitly designed to affect giving or by general characteristics of the tax 
structure. The models discussed here focus on changes in the tax-defined 
price and net income of donors. By no means does this imply that taxes 
are the only or the most important influence on charitable giving, merely 
that they have some effect. The econometric studies discussed in chapter 2 
yield the clear implication that taxes do  in fact have a significant effect. 
Two kinds of effects can be distinguished in the simulation results pre- 
sented here. First, tax provisions may affect the level of total giving. For 
example, eliminating the charitable deduction would cause total giving to 
fall by about ope quarter, assuming tax rates were adjusted to keep rev- 
enues constant and donors had sufficient time to adjust to their new levels 
of giving. A similar effect on total giving is the $1 billion increase in 1983 
due to the limited charitable deduction for nonitemizers.  A second and 
equally important effect of these tax provisions is on the distribution of 
contributions by the income class of donors and by the types of organiza- 
tions supported. Although a 20 percent tax credit would have a limited im- 
pact on total giving, the simulations suggest that contributions to some 
types of organizations would fall by more than a third. Another case in 
point is the 1981 tax act. By cutting marginal tax rates of the taxpayers in 
the highest brackets and extending a deduction to nonitemizers, the law is 
projected to bring about a marked decrease in the share of contributions 
made by upper-income taxpayers. 